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It is my great pleasure to be able to introduce the research topic
on Time and Causality. The topic had been hosted simultaneously
on Frontiers in Perception Science and Frontiers in Cognitive
Science. Doing so acknowledged that the human experiences of
Time and Causality mutually constrain each other, and attracted
high-quality submissions from awide range of authors whomight
previously not have published in the same outlet.
The majority of research on Time and Causality in previ-
ous decades investigated how temporal information constrains
causal inference (for an overview see Buehner, 2005). More
specifically, such research is rooted in David Hume’s assessment
that causal knowledge must be inferred from non-causal input,
in a manner where empirical cues of contingency, contiguity,
and temporal priority elicit causal impressions in a bottom-
up manner (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Buehner and May,
2002). The first half of this volume includes articles from this
tradition. Greville and Buehner (2012) pick up on the well-
established finding that degrading cause-effect contiguity leads to
concomitant decrements in causal learning. Their contribution
asked whether the extent to which causal inferences are adversely
affected by delay is related to temporal discounting, the phe-
nomenon whereby rewards lose value over time. If causal learning
is drawing on principles of associative learning (cf. Dickinson,
2001), then it would be reasonable to find such commonal-
ities; Greville and Buehner (2012), however, do not evidence
for such commonalities. Msetfi et al. (2012) revisit a classic
phenomenon in covariation-based causal learning: Depressive
Realism—the finding that dysphoric individuals appear to have
a more realistic impression of the (absence of) cause-effect
contingencies. In their contribution, Msetfi et al. (2012) show
that dysphoric individuals are particularly sensitive to temporal
shifts in contingency, i.e., momentary changes of action-outcome
effectiveness.
Rankin and McCormack’s (2013) is the first of two develop-
mental articles in the volume and clarifies previously ambigu-
ous or contradictory evidence regarding the understanding of
the temporal priority principle—that causes must precede their
effects. With improved and standardized methods, Rankin and
McCormack (2013) find that even 3 year olds are sensitive to this
principle, but also that there is developmental progression toward
more consistent application of it. Schlottmann et al.’s (2013) con-
tribution is from the domain of perceptual causality, concerning
visual stimuli that lead to immediate and compelling impres-
sions of causality, despite the impoverished nature of the stimuli.
Schlottmann et al. (2013) examined the developmental progres-
sion of the distinction between physical and social causality, and
find that spatio-temporal cues play an important role in making
this distinction. Woods et al. (2012) also examined perceptual
causality and its sensitivity to spatio-temporal manipulations.
They find that context and prior experience heavily influences
people’s sensitivity to temporal as well as spatial violations of
causal expectations.
The second block of articles represents research inspired by
relatively recent efforts to examine how causal knowledge influ-
ences our perception of time. Temporal binding (Haggard et al.,
2002) refers to the subjective shortening of time that occurs when
a cause is followed by its effect (as opposed to an unrelated event),
and/or subjective shifts in event perception whereby causes and
effects mutually attract each other, resulting in delayed aware-
ness of the former, and early awareness of the latter. Faro et al.
(2013) open this section with a review of recent literature in
this area. Moore et al. (2013) provide further evidence of tem-
poral causal binding from merely observed actions, and argue
that causal binding receives a boost when the cause is perceived
to be an intentional action. Their study provides an impor-
tant methodological improvement over previous work because it
offered better control over the perceptual stimuli. Moore et al.
(2013) also provide fMRI data that suggests that the intention-
ality/causality interaction is subserved by similar brain regions as
those involved in agency. Rohde and Ernst (2013) demonstrate
that temporal adaptation is symmetrical. People adapt to action-
outcome sequences such that the point of subjective simultaneity
(PSS) of action and outcome shifts forward following exposure
to action—delay—outcome sequences. Importantly, when—in a
clever experimental setup—participants experienced outcome—
delay—action sequences, the PSS analogously shifted backwards.
While at first this might appear to violate the causal asymme-
try, this result actually fits with the unity assumption inherent
in Bayesian accounts of perception. Parsons et al. (2013) chal-
lenge an internal-clock based interpretation of temporal causal
binding and instead make a convincing case for a realignment
of the sensory and motor timeline. Asai and Kanayama (2012,
2013) conclude the volume with a contribution on the cutaneous
rabbit effect (CRE), a tactile illusion resulting from a causal inter-
pretation of spatio-temporal stimulation of the skin. Asai and
Kanayama (2012, 2013) show that the CRE is modulated by visual
stimuli, when these “fit” with the causal interpretation of the
experienced spatio-temporal pattern.
In sum, this volume is testament to convergence of research
on time perception and causal inference, in two ways: Firstly,
as the two thematic blocks of articles show, there is now a
clear recognition that Time and Causality mutually constrain
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each other in human experience. Not only do temporal param-
eters influence our causal experience, but the construal of causal
relations in the mind also affects the way we perceive and
experience time. Importantly, the volume also highlights the
convergence of methods and disciplines that is happening in
this area. Time and Causality are now firmly on the agenda of
cognitive, developmental, social, clinical, and applied psychol-
ogists, perception researchers and psychophysicists, as well as
neuroscientists and philosophers. Future questions include what
exactly the relation is between time, causality, and agency, and
to what extent they share common neural markers, how per-
ceptual adaptation relates to the experience of agency, causality,
and temporal order, and how extant models of time perception
(i.e., internal clocks) relate to causality-induced shifts in time
perception.
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